

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Senior Review Panel

NIC-8842-83/3-1
10 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
NIO for Western Europe

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft
Concept Paper and Terms of Reference
(TOR) for NIE 28.2-84: NATO and Nordic
Security, dated 2 February 1984

1. The Panel believes the subject papers will provide an excellent basis for a timely and useful estimate. We have a few suggestions intended to clarify context and sharpen focus.

2. Scope seems to us a bit cramped:

a. Iceland and Greenland are closely linked to the Nordic area. Iceland especially would play an important strategic and tactical role in Nordic security and merits some discussion in the paper.

b. East Germany and Poland, as Baltic powers, have identifiable and potentially significant relationships with the Nordic countries. We think they should also be briefly included among the factors bearing on the problem.

c. Sweden seems to us deserving of more attention than the present TOR--in contrast to the Concept Paper--indicate. Likely trends in Swedish politics and foreign policy over the time frame of the estimate merit thorough analysis.

3. Soviet perceptions of the Nordic problem need further development. How do they regard the correlation of forces in the Baltic area? How do they view their basic security requirements in case of a confrontation with the US and/or NATO with respect

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to the Nordic countries? Given the sensitivity of the Soviets to the Baltic approaches, what would be the likely Soviet military actions in the case of a confrontation with the US outside the NATO area--within the NATO area?

4. Alternative Nordic reactions or initiatives appear to us largely neglected in the present TORs. As examples:

a. Assuming Nordic commitment to the defense of their respective individual territories, what are their capabilities to defend themselves against a Soviet conventional attack? How are these likely to change over the next three to five years? In what circumstances would they come to one another's aid, and what would their mutual defensive capabilities be?

b. In the event of a US-Soviet confrontation outside the NATO area, what would be the likely posture of the Nordic countries?

c. Similarly, individual Nordic countries have direct bilateral relations with the US (and possibly the UK and Canada), as well as with each other which could have a major influence on aspects of the security situation. Are these likely to develop further, remain, or wither through non-renewal or progressive restrictions?

5. Subversion. Finally, we wonder if it would not be useful to examine Soviet capabilities for subversion, the implications of their intelligence penetrations in the region, and the strength and weaknesses of internal security in the several Nordic countries.

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cc: DDCI
VC/NIC (Waterman & Meyer)

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